The power of the party is the key to dictators who maintain control amid corruption, research discovers

A new study from the University of Massachusetts Amherst University provides new insight into why some dictatorial governments are attracting larger protests than others corruption, despite rampaging by some dictatorial governments. Published in the Journal Democratization, this study shows that ruling parties with deep institutional roots can effectively isolate rulers with absolute power from the destabilizing effects of corruption.

Using global data from 1955 to 2010 and new measures by M. Rosemary Pang, lecturer in data analysis and computational social sciences at UMass Amherst, we show that the more institutionalized the ruling party, the less likely it is to overthrow undemocratic regimes.

“While corruption could increase anti-government protests, the level of institutionalization in the ruling party reduces the impact of corruption on protests,” Pan said.

This study presents three mechanisms by which these parties can suppress anti-government demonstrations.

Predictability of corruption – Institutionalized ruling parties create a structured system of corruption, making it more predictable, and therefore less likely to cause anger among citizens. When corruption follows a set pattern, individuals may view it as an undesirable but governance characteristic rather than arbitrary, generic abuse of power. However, this does not mean that corruption is harmless. This means that the impact on protest mobilization will vary depending on the methodology that is institutionalized. Distribution of Corruption Benefits – Like a weak and institutionalized regime, a strong ruling party distributes the economic benefits of corruption to the broader citizen base and reduces frustration. By integrating more individuals into corruption networks, these regimes block widespread opposition and generate vested interests to maintain the status quo. Rather than eliminating complaints, dissenting opinions can be led to party mechanisms by providing a management outlet to air complaints such as party negotiations and policy adjustments. This will prevent anxiety from protesting.

PANG’s measure of institutionalization of the undemocratic ruling party takes into account factors such as party longevity, organizational strength, and integration with civil society.

The study shows that corruption is generally correlated with an increase in dictatorial protests, but this effect decreases as ruling parties’ institutionalization is strengthened. In countries where power has been established, corruption has little effect on the level of protest, demonstrating the power to stabilize a strong party-structured regime.

Pan says that this power can withstand even if the ruler comes and goes.

“In non-democracies, simply removing corrupt leaders is not enough. If the ruling party remains strong, it can contribute to oppositional oppression and maintain a system of corruption,” she explains. “This is why promoting democracy should focus on weakening the ruling party institutions, not just individual leaders.”

While dictatorship and democracy work differently, Pang says the importance of institutions transcends a single form of government.

“If institutions are democratic and robust, they can maintain norms and hold leaders accountable. But corruption and instability can continue when institutions become weaker or become tools of political control, both in democracy and dictatorship,” she adds.